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STATEMENT OF FACTS, A REPLY WITH ARGUMENT 
Respondents have misstated the language of the Judgment. 
The interest of $2,180.00 was the amount of interest the Judgment 
allowed from the date of judgement until the judgment was paid. 
There can be no other interpretation of the language without 
changing what is said. To read in the idea that the $2,180.00 
was intended by the Court to apply until only until the date of 
judgment is contrary to the pleadings which were prepared by the 
Plaintiffs themselves and ignores the fact that the Plaintiffs 
never did correct their judgment. Even Respondents admit the 
language is somewhat unclear. That means it can be construed 
against them under the circumstances. 
The June 5, 1979 Order permitted the Defendants to take any 
appropriate action when the Judgment was sought to be enforced. 
That appropriate action was very broad, and applied to all of the 
Defendants arguments which were raised in connection with the 
Motion when the Order was given. The Court did not specify those 
elements, but because the Defendants did, they still are re-
served. All of them are a defense to enforcement of the Judg-
ment . 
Although the Court subsequently alleged it had previously 
ruled on various motions filed by the Defendants, it in fact had 
not. Plaintiffs refer the Court to the trial record at 101 which 
is a motion by the Defendants for certain relief. However, that 
motion comes in the midst of a flurry of motions which commence 
as early as at least October 8 (Record at 94 et. sec). Defend-
1 
ants pointed out to the Court numerous motions and issues which 
had never been ruled upon, and showed that the Court had reserved 
to the Defendants the right to take appropriate action. Even 
though the Court had not actually dealt with these issues, the 
Court in its decision of November 30, 1982, Record at 110, 
claimed that no new matters had been raised that had not pre-
viously been decided by the Court. However, if these have been 
decided, the decisions were well hid. The Court did not discuss 
the question of interest in excess of the judgment which Plain-
tiffs were trying to collect, even though at page 101 Defendants 
made mention of the fact that the judgment did not allow Plain-
tiffs to try for as much money as they were trying for. Since 
the Court allowed Defendants the right to raise various motions 
whenever enforcement was attempted, Defendants were free to raise 
that issue again and again. Moreover, the Court's Order, Record 
110, did not amend the Judgment, nor could it have. 
In pleadings dated November 8, 1982, Record 108, Plaintiffs 
admitted they took the judgment as stated and also compounded the 
interest. Nowhere in the judgment is this permitted. 
The remainder of Respondent's factual allegations lack merit 
or are disposed of in the Brief of Appellants. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
This Judgment did not bear interest beyond a specified 
amount, which the judgment provided would be the amount allowed 
until the judgment was paid. The judgment was never changed. 
The Court allowed the Defendants to make all the appropriate 
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motions if the Plaintiff's tried to enforce the Judgment, To 
have the Judgment allow accruing interest, it should have been 
changed but was not. The one case provided by Plaintiffs, in 
fact, would support a conclusion that the Judgment and Order 
below should be reversed, 
ARGUMENT 
Respondents cite one case only. Dairy Distributor's Inc. v. 
Local Union 976 et al. 12 U2d 85, 396 P2d 47 (1964), is argued as 
authority by Respondents for a conclusion that interest follows 
the judgment where statutory interest is permitted. However, the 
judgment in the instant case did not provide for statutory 
interest. It omitted it. Instead, the judgment provided far 
less than what might have been allowed had the pleadings been 
broader and the judgment drafted better. Under the circum-
stances, statutory interest is not permitted. In Dairy Distri-
butors, the Plaintiff filed a motion in 1963 to amend the 
Plaintiffs* 1957 judgment to provide for interest. The findings 
showed the clerk of the Court failed, because of oversight and 
inadvertence, to fill in blanks provided for interest under Rule 
54(e) . That Rule says that the clerk must include interest in 
any judgment signed by him, if the same has been ascertained. 
The instant case does not involve the signing of a judgment by 
the clerk, or filling in blanks. No more interest was ascer-
tained. The judgment was signed by the Judge and prepared by the 
Plaintiff. No oversight or inadvertence is alleged in the 
instant case. No clerk oversight or inadvertence exists. 
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Respondents filed no motion to correct the judgment and did not 
collect it before it expired. They have, however, tried to 
broaden its terms in their effort to renew the judgment. 
Respondents wrongfully ask this Court to affirm more than a 
mere correction of an inadvertent omission. Because of the 
clerk's omission in Dairy Distributors, the Court was able to 
apply 15-1-4, U. C. A. and say interest would be accrued and be 
collectable even though the judgment did not so provide. But, 
Section 15-1-4 U.C.A. also says interest must be specified in the 
judgment. The present case not only lacks an empty blank, but 
fails entirely to include language to specify the interest 
Respondents want to add. This case is not a situation where the 
judgment "did not so provide" for interest. It provided a 
specific amount, which limited Plaintiffs from any more. Any 
lawyer should be able to see it does not specify accruing 
interest. 
A mere lapse of time is not the problem with the instant 
judgment, as it was in Dairy Distributors. There were additional 
problems with the language, which foreclosed more interest. 
One reason Respondents refer to no more cases than this one 
is the fact that Dairy Distributors has been referred to only 
twice, neither of which help Plaintiffs, but the other two cases 
are of interest. It was cited along with other cases to support a 
New Mexico decision in Barker v. Barker 608 P2d 138 (N„M. 1980) 
to allow a July 1, 1977 Indiana divorce decree to be given full 
faith and credit by New Mexico in its December 21, 1978 Order. 
However, as in Dairy Distributors and unlike the instant case, no 
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terms or conditions were added to the Indiana decree. The action 
dealt with New Mexico full faith and credit jurisdiction only. 
In another divorce case, Preece v. Preece 682 P2d 298 (Utah 
1984) , this Court referred to Dairy Distributors for authority 
". . . to do an act upon one date and make it effective as of a 
prior date so that the record accurately reflects that which took 
place." Id., at 299. The Preece case was also from Judge 
Christoffersen's Court. The Judge in the hearing said the decree 
would be final "upon signing". He signed the decree after Mr. 
Preece died, and made the divorce effective on the hearing date. 
This very Court recognized that action by the trial court as a 
substantial departure from the earlier announcement, and directed 
that the decree be vacated and the action dismissed. The result 
was Mrs. Preece was a surviving widow instead of a divorced 
spouse. This Court said even nunc pro tunc orders ". . . should 
be the reflection of a previously made ruling" Id. at 300. The 
instant case lacks a previously made ruling to support Plain-
tiffs1 position. 
The function of nunc pro tunc orders is not to make an order 
"now for then, but to enter now for then an order previously 
made" Id. at 299. Since there was never a previous order in the 
instant case allowing anything more than "interest from the date 
hereof (April 18, 1979) until paid (it was paid, but Plaintiff 
never recognized payment) in the amount of $2,180.00", allowance 
of more interest is contrary to law and not allowed. Judge 
Christoffersen's Order should be vacated here, just as his extra-
legal action in Preece was disallowed in 1984. 
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CONCLUSION 
Neither Dairy Distributors nor any other authority would 
allow the Plaintiffs or the trial court to expand the Judgment 
beyond what its terms allowed* The Writs of Execution should be 
stricken as requested by Defendants. 
Respectfully submitted this jn day of July, 1987, 
± 
Raymond N. Malouf 
Attorney for Defendants/Appellants 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the /T day of July, 1987 four 
copies of the foregoing RESPONDENTS REPLY BRIEF regarding Case 
No. 870128-CA, postage prepaid to the following: 
N. George Daines, Esq. 
DAINES & KANE 
108 North Main, Suite 200 
Logan, Utah 84321 . 
Raymond N. Malouf 
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STATUTES 
Utah Code (1953) 
Section 15-1-4 - Any judgment rendered from a lawful 
contract shall conform thereto and shall bear the 
interest agreed upon by the parties, which shall be 
specified in the judgment * Attached 
RULES 
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the judgement Attached 
Raymond N. Malouf/dm 
MALOUF, MALOUF & JENKINS 
Attorneys for Defendants 
150 East 200 North #D 
Logan, UT 84321 
Telephone: 752-9380 
DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH, COUNTY OF CACHE 
NORMAN BARBER and HELEN 
BARBER, husband and wife, 
Plaintiff 
vs. 
THE EMPORIUM PARTNERSHIP, 
and VON K. STOCKING, 
DON A. WHITE, JR., and 
RAYMOND N. MALOUF, JR., 
general partners, 
Defendant 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR 
RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT 
AMD TO STRIKE 
SUPPLEMENTAL PROCEEDINGS 
Civil No. 17630 
Defendant Raymond N. Malouf requests relief from that 
judgment entered against him on April 18, 1979. Defendant 
further moves for this Court to strike the Supplemental 
Proceedings against this Defendant pending resolution of 
this motion. The basis for this motion, notwithstanding the 
Court's recent Memorandum Decision of October 19, 1982, and 
the reason relief should be granted (and the justification of 
this relief notwithstanding prior decisions) is as follows: 
1. The Court said October 19, 1982 that Defendant's 
April 28, 1982 Motion for Relief from Judgment was not 
timely filed. Yet, most of the same arguments were raised 
after the Judgment and prior to the Court's Memorandum 
Decision of May 21, 1979, to wit: that the Plaintiff's 
status as limited partners Imposed restrictions on the time 
and manner of payment, both according to the partnership 
agreement and according to Utah Code, Section 48-2-14(1); 
and that in view of the then current cash flov problems of 
the Emporium entity, Plaintiffs were restricted from proceeding 
to collect. Several other points were also raised in the 
detailed pleadings dated May 21, 1979 and April 30, 1979 
from the Defendants. In its Memorandum Decision dated 
May 21, 1979, the Judge stated: 
Defendant has filed a motion for amendment to the 
judgement, relief from judgment and a stay of execution. 
Generally the thrust of Defendants' argunent goes to 
questions of how the judgment should be enforced and 
priorities in connection therewith. 
neso-27 
EXHIBIT UL 
Therefore, Defendant3f Motion o^ uta^u, *^_ course, 
without prejudice to take any appropriate action when 
the Judgment is thought to be enforced. (Emphasis 
supplied). ~~—" 
The underlined language ^ e* *.j length of the decision, 
was obviously not to be wen 1 • ds\* *• i, wa.s nof , Even 
though it is unusual language for a Memorandum Decision n\\ a 
Summary Judgment Motion, it certainly must mean something. 
Defendants believe it must ttow be applied to this Judgment 
according to several factors which existed including (1) the 
Bankruptcy Law that existed at the time; (2) the status of 
the partnership; and (3) the status of the agreements in 
effect between the Plaintiffs as partners lending money and 
the Defendant. Defendants believed then, and believes now, 
and relied en the belief, that the Court did not believe 
that the co 11 ec11.on o £ the j udgment was en forceab 1 e at the 
time the Memorandum Decision was rendered because of all the 
arguments the Defendants had raised, and that those arguments 
were not rejected. 
Defendants strongly be1ieve that the 1 "ourt, in its 
Memorandum Decision of October 19, 1982, has not addressed 
the question of exactly what "appropriate action" is in the 
event enforcement is attempted in view of the arguments 
raised by Defendants pleadings entitled "Reply. . ." and 
dated May 13, 1982, In that pleading Defendants argued that 
the Plaintiffs were estopped because of their limited 
partnership status, Utah law, and the contract from proceeding 
against this Defendant. The Court, after argument, indicated 
it would review the arguments in the pleadings. Because of 
the May 21, 1979 decision, it should not have dismissed 
Defendants1 argument as having been 1 1 ntime J y fi1ed, because 
they had been timely filed April 30 and May 21, 1979, and 
were kept in reserve by the Courtfs decision on May 21, 
1979. The door having been left open by the Court on May 21, 
1979, \i should now provide an interpretati on as to what the 
"appropriate action" was, by applying that standard to each 
of the arguments raised by the Defendants. This is necessary 
to permit the Court's order to make sense to either adequately 
explain, to the Defendants what was intended or to provide a 
basis for appellate revi ew. 
2. Rule 60(b) U.R.CJ-", lies not present a timeliness issue 
under subparts 5, 6 and 7. It is under these subparts that 
this motion is made, as wau the April 21, 1982 Motion. 
EXHIBIT A 95 
3. Defendant herein makes two arguments for the fact, 
under subpart (5) of Rule 60(b), that the Judgment is void. 
First, the pleadings do not at any point reflect the fact 
that this Defendant was a general partner at the time the 
Barber's note was signed by Von Stocking and Don White in 
November of 1977. For purposes of this pleading, Defendant 
herein did admit he was a general partner, but the admission, 
as framed by the pleading, can only go to the status in 
January 1979, when the suit was filed. There is no basis to 
believe this Defendant was a general partner for the prior 
debt, which this suit was all about. The general partner 
does not assume the debts of an entity in which he was not a 
general partner unless there is a specific acknowledgement 
to that fact, and there was none. Neither the Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law nor any pleadings say this 
Defendant was a general partner when that note was signed, 
or make a finding that he should be accountable for the 
note. Accordingly, it should be found that the judgment is 
void as against this Defendant because the pleadings don't 
support the judgment. Or, the Plaintiff should have to 
litigate the question of whether this Defendant was a general 
partner at the time the note was signed in view of the fact 
that he has never admitted personal liability for that note, 
his signature did not appear on the note, nor did his name 
appear with any payments on the note from the partnership, 
checks of the partnership. See Davis v. West et. al, 71 
F.Supp 377. A partner is not liable for contracts concluded 
before he became a partner without a special agreement. The 
judgment can be modified to exclude such a partner. 
Second, the judgment as it is attempted to be enforced 
is void against this Defendant because this Defendant is not 
jointly and severally liable even if he was a general partner 
at the time the note was signed. To wit, the Complaint, the 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and the Judgment 
all fail to recite joint and several liability, and Section 
48-1-12 of the Utah Code Annotated does not permit joint and 
several liability. This was argued as point three in the 
reply dated May 13, 1982. Also referred to is the case of 
Palle v. Industrial Commission, 7 P2d 284 which required 
proceeding against members on a debt jointly, and not separately. 
Thus the distinction between "joint" and "joint and several11 
is critical in this case, and the judgment is voidable 
against this Defendant as this Defendant singled out for 
proceedings separately from all other Defendants which is 
EXHIBIT A 96 
contrary to 48-1-12, Utah Code Annotated, Defendant believes 
Plaintiff wants payment of the whole debt from, hi 11 alone 
based on the Plaintiff's efforts and such a result Is not 
within the meaning of UCA 48-1-12 or the Bankruptcy laws as 
they exist at the time of the Judgment, which required 
payment of a partners *< v \ hi a :** , -»r- -t- payment >f 
partnership debts. See R .le 5(g) B r tnkn:u u-* -* Rep 
989,95th congress, 2nd °^  - '••*•. 
4. De f e nd an t a 1 s o r e q ue s t s r e 3 i e f i i nd e r s ub p a r a g r a oh (6 ) 
of Rule 60(b) in that I t i s no longer equitable that the 
Judgment shouId have prospect: ive app 1 icat ion agains t th i s 
Defendant in view of the foregoing arguments and the contents 
of the pleadings in the file and the prior decisions of this 
Court, which specifically permit the Defendants to, without 
p r e j ud ice , t ake ' * app r op r i a t e ac 11 o n"'' i £ en f or c emen t o f t he 
J ud g m e n t i s a 11 e rap t e d , B e c a u s e i:r 1: i e C o n r t ] e a d D e f e n d a n t s 
to believe that they could take appropriate action when the 
judgment was sought to be enforced, the Defendants rightly 
believed that included in that appropriate action is the 
right t o r e 1 y on t he s t a 11 11 e s o f t h 1 s s t at e a nd t he U. S . as 
well as the agreement made by the Plaintiffs notwithstandi ng 
the judgment the Court entered. The Judgment because of the 
qualification in the Court's memorandum decision and the 
subsequently entered order, is not enforceable without 
limitations, and 1,s not en£orceab 1 e sing 1 y against this 
Defendant. 
5 , De f e nd a n t: s a 1 s o r eq ue s t relief u nd e r Ru 1 e 60 (b ) (7) f o r 
the reason that if this Defendant is to be considered a 
genera 1 p a r t n e r f o r p ur ;> o • s o £ c h e d e £ ens e , l: h e n h i s assets 
are s ub j e c t t o t he provis • ns in S ect i on 72 3(a) o £ the 
Bankruptcy Reform Act, 7 is inconceivable that the Court 
would consider Defendants' Motion for Relief under this 
section as untimely in vi€*w of the fact that the Bankruptcy 
status of the partnership was created, well after the judgment 
in May of 1979, Bankruptcy was file*! tn November 1^79, and 
the matter was converted to a liquidation bankruptcy in May 
of 1981, where it still resides. Plaintiffs should be 
estopped from actions in State Court under the Stay Order. 
These recent attempts at; Supplemental Proceedings have been 
the first since the bankruptcy. The -Appropriate relief 
contemplated by the Court in May of 1979 certainly cou! A 
include the Stay Order issued by the Bankruptcy Court, and 
the provisions of section 723(a) of the Bankruptcy Reform 
Act. Defendant requests tl ie Court: to specifically address 
i t s r e a s o n i n g , i £ a n y, f o r r e j e c t i n g t h I. s c 1 a i m £ o r r e 1 i e £ 
EXHIBIT h 
6. Petitions for relief under Rule 60(b)(5, 6, 7) do not 
face a time limit for asking for relief. The Court is also 
permitted to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the Court. 
A review of the pleadings on this matter abundantly shows 
that initial counsel for the Plaintiffs purpetrated fraud, 
either by mistake or on purpose, by failing to allege and 
prove that this Defendant was a partner at the time the note 
was signed or was otherwise responsible for the note. He 
only alleged parter status at the time the pleadings were 
filed. The Court was also misinformed by Plaintiffs who 
presented arguments which wholly ignored the fact that the 
Plaintiffs had signed an agreement which prospectively 
governed the circumstances of their loan to the partnership. 
There is adeqaute basis for this Court to set aside the 
judgment as it applies to this Defendant for all of these 
reasons, too. 
DATED this <S 0 day of October, 1982. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the day of October, 1982 
I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing to N. 
George Daines, Esq., Attorney for Plaintiffs, 128 North 
Main, Logan, Utah 84321 by depositing said copy in the U.S. 
mail, postage prepaid. 
EXHIBIT A 98 
Raymond N. Malouf/dm 
MALOUF, MALOUF & JENKINS 
Attorneys for Defendants 
150 East 200 North #D 
Logan, UT 84321 
Telephone: 752-9380 
PI STRICT C01PR7, ".TA'IT 1" UTAH , "'"tHN'l V" IF" CAl'Ml' 
NORMAN BARBER and HELEN 
BARBER, husband and wife, 
PI aintiff ORDER 
vs. 
THE EMPORIUM PARTNERSHIP, 
and VON K. STOCKING, 
DON A. WHITE, JR., and 
RAYMOND N. MALOUF, JR., 
general partners, 
Defendant Civil No. 17630 
Based on the Mqtion for Relief from Judgment presented 
to this Court by ro«Jendant Raymond M. I falouf, the Court 
hereby g-tiirilyre^  the Motion In Supplemental Proceedings, which 
was ordered for the 1st day of November, 1982, U* 
DATED this J**/ day of <^C/ 
VeNoy 
Dist 
:sen, 
Coi&rt Judge 
l%3u-M 
SOC'K 
(SL^ EXH1B1 
IN TO! Mtincr coutr OP nn ran JUDICIAL oisnuct 
fYAfl Or UTAH 
Wormm & Helen 3arber 
Plaintiff1 
The £rpor±um Partneiship 
Defendant 
ORDERED ENTERED Ifcrcenter 1 , 1932 
CASE NUMBER 17630 
VE NOY CHRISTOFFERSEM, Judge 
Judge 
George Parker, Court Reporter 
Court Reporter 
. . . . ^ . f f l f o f f S Court Cleric 
Type of hearing: Suf .p. Proceeding* . 
Preeent: Pttf Deft _. . 
P. Atty 
a Atty 
Sworn and Examined: 
PW Deft 
Othera 
XX 
..... OSC _ Other 
Ret of Serv Stipulation . 
_ On motion of 
the matter la continued to ~ 
Order filed. Hearing continued without date t i l l notion is decided. 
EXHIBIT *0t> 
Raymond N. Malouf/dm 
MALOUF, MALOUF & JENKINS 
Attorneys for Defendants 
150 East 200 North //D 
Logan, UT 84321 
Telephone: 752-9380 
DISTRICT COURT, STATE Of UTAH, COUNTY OF CACHE 
NORMAN BARBER and HELEN BARBER, 
husband and wife, 
Plaintiff MOTION TO STRIKE WRIT 
OF EXECUTION AND MOTION 
vs. TO RELEASE LEVIED FUNDS 
T H £ E M p 0 R I U M P A R T N E R S H I P > a n d 
VON K. STOCKING, DON A. WHITE, 
JR., and RAYMOND N. MALOUF, JR., 
general partners, 
Defendant Civil No. 17630 
Defendants move this Court strike the Writ of Execution 
Issued by the Clerk of the Cour t: on October 26, 198.2 for the 
reason that the Writ of Execution alleges a total sum iue of 
$31,693.65, which amount Is $10,000, or more, greater than 
the amount of the Judgment as recorded. 
Defendants further move that the Court release that 
c e r t: a I n 1 e vy a g a i n s t a ch e ck ma d e p a y a b 1 e 1" o the Cache 
County Sheriff in the amount of $2,59^.'*2 for ttw reason 
that the check delivered to the Sheriff was delivered as 
partial satisfaction of a judgment entered in No. 20610A in 
this Court, (Malouf, Malouf & Jenkins vs. Don C. Loosle). 
There Is no order of M i s Court finding " •' -'•- amount of 
money owed to Malouf, Malouf Si lenklns * ivailal- * £ >r 
execution in satisfaction of a judgment entered against 
Raymond N. Malouf, Jr., and as such, such a levy is contrary 
to law and represents an abuse of process. 
DATED this c£? day of November, 1982. 
aymond N. Malouf / R
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the ^/^ day of November, 1982, 
I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing to N. George 
Dailies, attorney for Plaintiffs, 128 North Main, Logan, Utah 
84321 along with a copy of the proposed order by depositing 
said documents In the 11 S, Mali, postage prepaid. 
m.: 3<i ihj^tmiMt^j 
Secret^ri 
EXHIBIT 0 101 
Raymond N. Malouf/dm 
MALOUF, MALOUF & JENKINS 
Attorneys for Defendants 
150 East 200 North #D 
Logan, UT 84321 
Telephone: 752-9380 
DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH, COUNTY OF CACHE 
NORMAN BARBER and HELEN 
BARBER, husband and wife,, 
Plaintiff REPLY 
vs. 
THE EMPORIUM PARTNERSHIP, 
and VON K. STOCKING, DON 
A. WHITE, JR., and RAYMOND 
N. MALOUF, JR., general 
partners, 
Defendant Civil No. 17630 
In support of Defendants1 prior Motion for Relief from 
Judgment and to Strike Supplemental Proceedings, the Defendants 
reply to the Plaintiffs' Memorandum as follows: 
1. Defendants1 Motion dated October 28, 1982 for 
relief from judgment states those several objections which 
exist and which provide a legitimate basis for the Court to 
deny Plaintiffs1 Motion and Supplemental Proceeding. 
2. The October 28 Motion has not been resolved and it 
is, therefore, inappropriate to reset supplemental proceedings. 
3. The October 28, 1982 Motion requested this Court 
to explain its prior memorandum decision in view of each of 
the arguments in the context of the Court's prior order^of 
May 21, 1979. In that Order the Court said the Defendants1 
Motions were denied without prejudice to take any appropriate 
action when the judgment is sought to be enforced. Based on 
that language, the Defendants did nothing further until the 
Plaintiffs sought enforcement of the Judgment. At that 
point, various arguments were raised. It is alleged in the 
October 28 pleading that such arguments, in view of the 
Court's language that appropriate action could be taken 
later when the Judgment was sought to be enforced, would and 
did toll at a time any 60(b) Motions need to be made. 
4. Most of the motions for relief from judgment are 
not barred In any event by the three month limitation in 
Rule 60(b) so the Defendants are entitled to an explanation 
as to the basis of each of their objections, and the Court 
should deal with each of them on other than a timeliness 
basis. 
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5 rhe Defendants i , r.* *c: >h. r .'8, 1982 
Motion, argue for relief .-r * ul : La* , ' ir ; • Defendant 
Malouf based on Utah Statute 48-1-12 which only allows for 
joint but not joint and several liabi lity \ inder the facts In 
this case 
6. Si nee cK.* -. *-uf* . ii the Defendants they could 
take appropriate acrh A \• enforcement of the Judgment * 
sought, the Court should enter an order dealing with all oi 
the requests for relief filed April 30 and May 21, 1979 and 
thereafter by this Court, so that the Defendnats will have a 
ruling from this Court: on each of those points which will 
provide either an interpretation of what appropriate relief 
the Court had in mind, a basis for the Courtfs deniel of the 
relief as requested then (which was never given then) and a 
basis for appellet review, or any of the foregoing. 
7 rhe P1aintiff has illegally a11empted to 1evy >JII 
monies owed Defendant's fiini. He falsely assumes that *ll 
of it is money to which the Defendant is entitled, 
DATED this / day of November, 1982. 
CERTIFICATE Of MAILING 
I hereby certify that « :>n the JJ2 day °f November, 1982 
I mailed a true and correct copy • ::»£' the foregoing to N. 
George Daines, 128 North Main, Logan, Utah 84321 by depositing 
said copy in the U.S. mail, postage prepaid. 
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Attorney at Law 
128 North Main 
Logan, Utah 84321 
Telephone: 753-4403 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CACHE 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
NORMAN BARBER and HELEN ) 
BARBER, husband and wife, 
* 
) 
THE EMPORIUM PARTNERSHIP, and 
VON K. STOCKING, DON A. WHITE, ) 
JR., and RAYMOND N. MALOUF, JR., 
general partners, * 
Defendants. ) 
RESPONSE TO MOTIONS 
Civil No. 17630 
COME NOW the Plaintiffs Barber and respond to 
Defendant Malouf1s Motion to Strike Writ of Execution to Release 
Funds as Follows: 
I. CALCULATION OF AMOUNT OF JUDGMENT IS CORRECT. 
Plaintiff's Counsel simply took the judgment as stated 
figured the principal amount, attorneys fees and compounded interest. 
If Defendant Malouf s calculations reveal a different set of 
figures he should indLcate their method of computation and the 
court can decide the correct computation. This is quite irrelevant 
here because any method of calculation will yield an amount at 
least five times longer than the amount levied upon. 
II. EFFECTIVENESS OF A LEVY ON PARTNERSHIP FUNDS FOR A 
DEBT OF ONE OF THE INDIVIDUAL PARTNERS. 
At present the Plaintiffs have served the Sheriff with 
an execution respecting the interest of Mr. Ray Malouf as a 
partner reletive to a sum of money the Sheriff holds which is 
payable to Malouf, Malouf & Jenkins a partnership. Concurrently 
therewith Mr. Ray Malouf was served with a Motion and Order 
respecting Supplementary Proceedings requiring him to be present oji 
November 1, 1982 to which he has again objected and to which the 
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Plaintiffs have responded. 
The Utah Code handles this situation with specificity. See 
§48-1-25 U.C.A. 19.53, wherein it states that under these 
circumstances the court shall determine the rights of the debtor 
partner to the asset in question and shall direct that amount to 
be applied against the unsatisfied judgment. Had Mr. Malouf not 
objected that hearing would have occurred on November 1, 1982. 
Pending that hearing no funds can or should be ordered released 
from the Sheriff's custody. 
The fact that Mr. Malouf has filed yet another frivolous 
motion to avoid his proper appearance should not be the occasion 
for this court to allow him to further escape the effect of this 
unsatisfied judgment. 
WHEREFORE Plaintiffs pray that the Court direct Defendant 
Malouf to declare what specific interest he has in the funds 
held pursuant to §48-1-25, that the Sheriff might properly 
apply that amount against his unsatisfied judgment. 
DATED this y h day of IVY/IM/V^ , 1982. 
N. George Daines^ 
Attorney at Law 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Response to Motions was mailed, postage prepaid to 
Mr. Raymond N. Malouf of MALOUF, MALOUF & JENKINS, 150 2ast 
200 North #D, Logan, Utah 84321 on the <%rA day of K'Vv^ ivlVi^ ', 
1982. 
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IN THE FIRST DISTRICT COURT OP CACHE COUNTY, UTAH 
NORMAN BARBER and HELEN 
BARBER, husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
THE EMPORIUM PARTNERSHIP, 
and VAN K. STOCKING, DON A 
WHITE, JR., and RAYMOND N. 
MALOUF, JR., general partners, 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Civil Number 176 30 
Defendant Raymond N. Malouf, has filed a Motion For Relief 
From Judgement and to strike Supplemental Proceedings. No new 
matters have been raised in this motion that have not previously 
been decided by the court in granting the judgement in question, 
therefore, the motion is denied and the previous order staying 
Supplemental Proceedings will be terminated. As to the motion 
to strike a writ of execution, and a motion for release of levied 
funds; if such funds belongs to third-oarties they mav seek relief 
under 69 (j) . 
Counsel for Plaintiffs to prepare the appropriate order. 
DATED this^^day of November, 19 82. 
N.* oeorge feli^ 
Raymond N. Malou? 
No. Maia, Logan, Utah 84321 
jL Z-No- //D, Logan, Utah 84321 
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 CONTIACTS AND OBLIGATIONS IN GENERAL 
15-1-4. Interest on judgments. 
Any judgment rendered on a lawful contract shall conform thereto and shall 
bear the interest agreed upon by the parties, which shall be specified inti* 
judgment; other judgments shall bear interest at the rate nM2% per annuj^  
1943. 444M;L. I Ml, d T w . | 2. * C* *******"" « * * * * • «* Civil I W 
Am.odm.nt Notei - X . l&l .mend. * " * R u k 64<<)-
men* increased the interest rat* from 8% to 
1AA 
PART VII JUDGMENT 
Rule 54. Judgments; Costs 
(e) Interest and Costs to be Included in the Judgment. The 
clerk must include in any judgment signed by him any interest 
on the verdict or decision from the time it was rendered, and the 
costs, if the same have have been taxed or ascertained. The clerk 
must, within two days after the costs have been taxed or ascer-
tained, in any case where not included in the judgment, insert 
the amount thereof in a blank left in the judgment for that pur-
pose, and make a similar notation thereof in the Register of 
Actions and in the Judgment Docket. 
